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DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS-NOT
FOR GAY PEOPLE?: EU EASTERN
ENLARGEMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF
SEXUAL MINORITIES
Dimitry Kochenov t
"We want to enter Europe, not Sodom and Gomorrah."
Position of one of the Romanian MPs voting against
the decriminalisationof homosexual acts.'
"The Assembly ...

calls upon the World Health Organisation

to delete homosexuality from its International
Classification of Diseases."
ParliamentaryAssembly of the Council of Europe,
Resolution 756 (1981), § 6
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INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT 2

Gays and lesbians in Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs) did not have any rights under communism, where homosexuality had either been a criminal offence or, at best, the official attitude towards it could be characterised as repressive tolerance.3 The
development of civil rights and freedoms, which started after the collapse of the communist regimes, did not immediately result in a break
through in the sphere of gay rights:4 "[i]n the midst of the multifaceted
transformation of [the CEECs], the status of gay and lesbian residents
has undergone varied and dramatic changes and is still in flux."5
Many hopes for change in this situation were related to the process of
enlargement of the European Union (EU) and were fuelled by the
belief that the EU would ensure that no country turning a blind eye to
the problems related to gay rights and allowing discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation would be permitted to join. As it turned
out, these hopes were only partly justified. The actions of the EU
were timid, ill-focused, and stopped short of realising the potential for
change offered by the legal context of enlargement preparation. Such
developments can be explained by the limited nature of Community
competences in this field, especially true at the very beginning of the
enlargement process and which were certainly influenced by the questionable gay rights record of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
The EU did not decouple the pre-accession human rights monitoring
of the candidate countries from its own internal incompetence in the
2. There is at least one other article on the same subject. See generally Travis J.
Langenkamp, Comment, Finding Fundamental Fairness: Protecting the Rights of
Homosexuals Under European Union Accession Law, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 437

(2003).
3. See Michael Jose Torra, Comment, Gay Rights after the Iron Curtain, 22
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., 73 74-75 (1998). Communist regimes also used homosex-

uality as an accusation against dissenters, using homophobic criminal law to prosecute
dissidents. Turcescu & Stan, supra note 1, at 291.
4. The term "gay" used throughout the note encompasses a reference to lesbian
women, homosexual men, and bi-sexual people.
5. Torra, supra note 3, at 73.
A tn
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field of gay rights and the limited scope of the acquis in this area.6
While the situation improved slightly over the last few years preceding
the enlargement, it is clear that the current adopted practice is unsustainable and that the EU should seriously consider allowing gay rights
to play a more prominent role in the course of the preparation of future enlargements.
A.

Internal Reform, Enlargement, and Gay Rights: Turbulent
Legal Developments

Advocate General Elmer argued in his opinion in Grant v. SouthWest Trains Ltd. that:
Equality before the law is a fundamental principle in every community governed by the rule of law and accordingly in the [European]
Community as well. The rights and duties which result from Community law apply to all without discrimination and therefore also to
the approximately 35 million citizens of the Community... who are
homosexual.7
As the decision in Grant,8 which "does the European Court of Justice little credit as a constitutional court,"9 has demonstrated, this
statement did not amount to anything more than wishful thinking.
Even the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty,1" with its Article 13 EC allowing for the adoption of the legislative measures prohibiting, inter alia, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
the Equal Treatment Directive that followed," did not change the situation entirely. De facto, there is still discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in the EU.
Viewing the case-law of the ECJ 1 2 in the context of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECt.HR) 13 and some national jurisdictions
6. Acquis communautaireincludes the whole body of legal instruments in force in
the European Union. See Christine Delcourt, The Acquis Communautaire: Has the
Concept Had Its Day?, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 829, 852-53 (2001).
7. Opinion of the Advocate-General, Sept. 30, 1997, 42, Case C-249/96, Grant
v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-621. All the ECJ case-law is available at
http://curia.europa.eu/ and http://eur-lex.europa.eu in all the official languages of the
EU.
8. Grant, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621.
9. Nicholas Bamforth, Sexual Orientation Discrimination After Grant v. SouthWest Trains, 63 MOD. L. REV. 694, 720 (2000). For a somewhat more Court-friendly
analysis, see Christa Tobler, Kroniek: Discriminatie op grond van geslacht, NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR EUROPEES RECHT,

Apr.-May 1998, at 74, 78-79.

10. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 1, 24, 26, 86. The Official Journal of the European Union is available
online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/.
11. Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC).
12. See discussion infra Part V.B.
13. See discussion infra Part VI.
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of the Member States of the EU provides an uneasy picture-both
negative and positive developments can be observed.
The piling up of diverse and often contradictory European jurisprudence in the field of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gay rights was accompanied in recent years by a veritable
explosion of legislation, marking an upcoming tide of recognition of
same-sex unions and same-sex marriages, 4 as well as aiming at outlawing discrimination. Viewed in the broader context of world developments, and given that the gay, lesbian and bisexual rights
movement has achieved global scale,' 5 Europe, and especially the
"old" Member States of the EU (so-called "EU-15"), is hardly trailing
the leading jurisdictions in articulating the problems in the area of gay
rights and trying to effectively tackle them. This is especially true in
the field of the legal recognition of same-sex couples, where a number
of EU Member States can be placed alongside Canada, South Africa,
and the U.S. states of Massachusetts,' 6 California, 7 and Vermont. 8
Unfortunately but predictably, a certain backlash can be observed
in a number of jurisdictions. ECJ's Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd.
naturally came as a surprise after P. v. S.,9 and the ECt.HR's Frett v.
France2" was hardly to be expected after Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v.
Portugal." All in all, the beginning of this century and the last decade
of the previous has been a very turbulent time for the development of
gay rights in Europe, putting the sexual minorities, previously almost
unseen in the legal discourse, into the spotlight.
During the same period, the EU2 2 was simultaneously advancing in
two fields of crucial importance: deepening and widening. The pro14. See generally LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF
NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute & Mads
Andenws eds., 2001); Allison R. O'Neill, Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in the
European Community: The European Court of Justice'sAbility To Dictate Social Policy, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 199 (2004); 0. De Schutter & A. Weyembergh, La cohabitation lkgale une 9tape dans la reconnaissance des unions entre personnes du meme

sexe?, 49

JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX

93 (2000).

15. Carl F. Stychin, Same-Sex Sexualities and the Globalization of Human Rights
Discourse, 49 McGILL L.J. 951, 951 (2004).
16. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that the state cannot deny the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil
marriage to two peole of the same sex under the Massachusetts Constitution).

17.

CAL. FAM. CODE

§ 297.5(a) (Deering 2006).

18. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 899 (Vt.
1999); see Mary L. Bonauto, The Freedom to Marry for Same-Sex Couples in the

United States of America, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A
STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 177.
19. See Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-621; Case
C-13/94, P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143.
20. Frett6 v. France, App. No. 36515/97, 2002-1 Eur. Ct. H.R.
21. Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, 1999-IV Eur. Ct.
H.R. All the case-law of the ECt.HR is available online at http://www.echr.coe.int.

22. See generally F. AMTENBRINK & H.H.B. VEDDER, RECHT VAN DE EUROPESE
(Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006); DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPE46 2

UNIE,
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cess of deepening is illustrated by the successful conclusion of three
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC), resulting in three major
amendments of the founding Treaties 23 in less than a decade (Maastricht, 4 Amsterdam, 25 and Nice 26 ), and, indeed, the creation of the
EU by the Maastricht EU Treaty. The adoption of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE)2 7 was meant to be the crown
to this achievement, but the French non and the Dutch nee have made
this development unlikely, thus leaving the aims of the Laeken Declaration unattained,28 including the simplification of the "Constitutional
Charter" of the Communities2 9 and making the EU more democratic
and transparent.3 0 This development notwithstanding, the EU as we
know it today is clearly superior in comparison with the pre-Maastricht Communities, indicating that the reform was a success.
The same can be said about the process of widening. The recent
expansions of 2004 and 2007 brought the number of the Member
States to 27,31 marking the most significant increase in the number of
UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS (2006); PAUL CRAIG
LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2003).

&

GRAINNE DE BURCA,

EU

23. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/ecsc en.htm; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/ecsc_en.htm;
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Mar. 25,
1957, http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/ecscen.htm. The ECSC Treaty, in existence
for 50 years, expired on July 23, 2002. Benedetta Ubertazzi, The End of the ECSC, 8
EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 20 (2004), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-020.
htm.
24. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
25. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 1.
26. Treaty of Nice, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1.
27. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310)
1.
28. See The Future of the European Union-Laeken Declaration (Dec. 15, 2001),
http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/offtext/docl5l2Olen.htm.
29. Case 294/83, Parti 6cologiste "Les Verts" v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339,
23.
30. It has been argued that the TCE was ill-suited to sufficiently address the
Laeken goals. See F. Amtenbrink, Europa: Democratischer: Transparanteren Efficienter?, in EUROPA; EENHEID IN VERSCHEIDENHEID? 121 (F. Amtenbrink & S.B.
van Baalen eds., 2005; Juliane Kokott & Alexandra RUth, The European Convention
and Its Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitutionfor Europe: Appropriate Answers to
the Laeken Questions?, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1315 (2003).
31. Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of
Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, Apr. 16, 2003, 2003 O.J.
(L 236) 17; see Kirstyn Inglis & Andrea Ott, EU-uitbreidingen Toetredingsverdrag:
verzoening van droom en werkelijkheid, 4 SOCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 146
(2004); Kirstyn Inglis, The Union's Fifth Accession Treaty: New Means To Make Enlargement Possible, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 937 (2004); Erwan Lannon, Le trait
d'adhsion d'Athdnes: Les ndgociations, les conditions de l'admission et les principales463
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Member States in the 50-year history of the polity sui generis.32 The
2004 enlargement was the fifth expansion in the history of European
integration.33 Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. 34 The
EU's success is attracting increasing numbers of countries. Three
more states are to follow: Croatia, Macedonia, (FYROM) and Turkey
enjoy a candidate country status, while accession negotiations have
already been opened with two of them (Croatia and Turkey). Moreover, a number of countries in Europe, Africa, and the Caucasus have
made it clear that accession to the EU is among their main foreign
policy objectives.3 5

adaptationsdes trait~s r~sultantde l'ilargissementde l'UE d vingt-cinq Etats membres,
in 40 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 15 (2004).
32. For discussion of the sui generis nature of the EU, see James A. Caporaso et
al., Does the European Union Represent an n of 1?, 10 ECSA REV. 3 (1997), available
at http://aei.pitt.edu/54/01/Nldebate.htm.
33. When the Treaties of Paris and Rome were signed, the Communities consisted
of six founding Member States: France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries.
The previous enlargements included: (1) accession of the U.K., Ireland, and Denmark, see Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland to the European Economic
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, Jan. 22, 1972, 1972 O.J.
(L 73); (2) accession of Greece, see Documents Concerning the Accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European Communities, 1979 O.J. (L 291); (3) accession of
Spain and Portugal, see Documents Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of
Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Communities, 1985 O.J. (L 302);
(4) accession of Austria, Sweden, and Finland, see Documents Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Republic of Finland and
the Kingdom of Norway to the European Union, 1994 O.J. (C 241). The last, 5th
round marked the accession of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta. See Documents Concerning the
Accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus,
the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak
Republic to the European Union, 2003 O.J. (L 236). The unification of Germany that
de facto amounted to the enlargement of the Communities to include the territory of
the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) is not counted as a separate round
since it was regulated by German law, not by the EU enlargement instruments.
Michael Bothe, The German Experience To Meet the Challenges of Reunification, in
EU ENLARGEMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPACT AT EU AND NATIONAL LEVEL
435, 437 (Alfred E. Kellermann et al. eds., 2001).
34. Documents Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and
Romania to the European Union, 2005 O.J. (L 157). Subject to the Commission's
approval, the date of accession could be moved to 2008. Id. at 10. See generally J.S.
van der Oosterkamp & A.S.N. Galama, De toetreding tot de Europese Unie van Bulgarije en Roemenie, 3 SOCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 8 (2007).
35. These countries include, but are not limited to, Albania, Bosnia i Herzegovina,
Cape Verde, Georgia, Montenegro, Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine. See Christopher
Melville, Government to Request EU Membership for Cape Verde, WORLD MKTS
ANALYSIS, May 9, 2005, available at Lexis-Nexis; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine, Integration Strategy (June 8, 1998), http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/publication/content/2823.htm.
464
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Although the latest enlargement was generally regulated by the
same principles as all the previous expansions of the EU,3 6 it was different from the previous expansions in legal terms. This difference
mostly concerned the formulation and subsequent application by the
EU of the conditionality principle,3 7 allowing it to "steer" the national
developments in the candidate countries in order to assure that the
new-comers comply with the pre-accession requirements of article
6(1) EU, including inter alia, democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights (gay rights included).3 8 The fifth enlargement
of the EU brought about a powerful mechanism to affect the state of
the law of those countries willing to join, and certainly had potential
to serve as a watermark for the protection of gay rights in Eastern
Europe.
This article analyzes the impact of enlargement of the EU on the
protection of gay rights in the new-coming states. In other words, it
aims at outlining the application of the enlargement conditionality
principle by the Community institutions in the course of the preparation of the fifth and the sixth enlargements to the promotion of gay
rights in the candidate countries and the acceding states. Viewing the
groundbreaking legal developments in the field of gay rights protection in Europe in the light of the enlargement preparation and the
dynamics of the EU's own development, including both Treaty reforms and enlargement, provides an excellent framework for the analysis of the effectiveness of the EU as an exporter of the principle of
nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well as of the
protection of gay rights.
B.

Structure of the Argument

Did gay rights matter in the course of the pre-accession "democracy, the rule of law, and human rights"3 9 assessment? How effectively did the EU act in order to promote gay rights? What kinds of
standards were available to it, and which standards were used in practice? Why, in the end, were the successes obtained so modest and
36. On the legal regulation of enlargements, see generally HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT (Andrea Ott & Kirstyn Inglis eds., 2002). See also EU ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH (Christopher Hillion ed., 2004); ROZSZERZENIE
UNIT EUROPEJSKIEJ: KORZY9CI I KOSZTY DLA NOWYCH KRAJ6W CZIONKOWSKICH
(Jaroslaw Kundera ed., 2005); Dimitry Kochenov, EU Enlargement Law: History and
Recent Developments: Treaty - Custom Concubinage?, 9 EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE

6 (2005), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-006.htm (providing an exhaustive
list of books on this issue in footnote 2).
37. EDWIGE TUCNY, L'ELARGISSEMENT DE L'UNION EUROPtENNE AUX PAYS
D'EUROPE CENTRALE ET ORIENTALE (L'Harmattan 2000); see Kochenov, supra note
36, at 14.
38. See discussion supra Part I.A.
39. As outlined in the Copenhagen political criteria, see Presidency Conclusions,
Copenhagen European Council (June 21-22, 1993), No. SN180/1/93. See discussion
infra Part II.B.
PAPERS
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demands so timid? In order to answer these questions, both the enlargement law of the EU and the legal measures related to the protection of gay rights in the EU legal system should be analysed.
Furthermore, it is necessary to put the applicable European law on
the issue into the context of legal developments in other jurisdictions,
both national (the Member States of the EU) and international, most
notably the ECt.HR. This will enable sober assessment of the successes as well as the failures of the EU in the pre-accession gay rights
protection and promotion.
The article starts by providing an outline of the EU enlargement
law in order to assess the arsenal of tools for the promotion of potential change in the sphere of gay rights legally at the disposal of the EU
with particular regard to the potential of the principle of conditionality in this respect (II). Then it turns to analysing the scope of the EU
competences for promoting gay rights in the course of the pre-accession exercise. It argues that checking the compliance of the candidate
countries with the basic principles set out in article 6(1) EU forms an
exception from the general rule of article 5 EC that the Community is
only competent in the areas where national sovereign powers have
been transferred to it by the Member States. Only the removal of the
pre-accession human rights assessment from the scope of the article 5
EC limitations could allow effective testing of the candidate countries'
readiness to join (III). The article then scrutinises the actual assessment of the level of gay rights protection provided by the Community
institutions in the course of enlargement preparation. Such analysis
reveals that gay rights only played a marginal role in the preparation
of the fifth enlargement, and no full use of the enlargement law instruments and pre-accession "steering" competences was made by the EU
in this particular field (IV). The section that follows is confined to the
analysis of the dynamics of the gay rights acquis in a bid to explain the
alarmingly low profile enjoyed by gay rights in the course of the preaccession exercise. Simple comparison between the pre-accession demands in the field of gay rights and the evolution of the scope of the
gay rights acquis demonstrates a clear correlation between the two, de
facto amplifying the deficiencies of the gay rights acquis, clearly not
suited to the role of a cornerstone of the pre-accession gay rights assessment (V). Lastly, the pre-accession developments in the field of
gay rights protection are put into the context of progress in this field
achieved in other jurisdictions and, most notably, the ECt.HR and the
U.N. Human Rights Committee. It is argued that these, alongside the
rules adopted by the EU-15, could provide the EU with more elaborated standards of gay rights protection than the Community gay
rights acquis (VI).
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the pre-accession process, Europe is facing an unprecedented improvement in the gay rights climate-the glorious march of the legal recognition of same-W
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partnerships and marriages, 40 the adoption of national non-discrimination legislation, and the successful transposition of the Equal Treatment Directive by all the Member States marked a crucial change in
the attitude of the legislator towards the problems of gay people and
the discrimination they suffered.4 1 Nevertheless, the article's conclusions are alarming-the powerful principle of conditionality in the
possession of the EU was largely disregarded in the course of preaccession gay rights promotion. This approach should be changed in
the preparation of the future expansions of the EU.
II.

EU

ENLARGEMENT LAW: CONDITIONALITY OF STICKS
AND CARROTS

A.

Principles and Application Criteria

In short, the essence of the EU enlargement law is that any democratic European state can join the EU by protecting human rights,
adhering to the principle of the rule of law, and sharing the objectives
of the EU. This is clearly spelled out in article 49 EU:
Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article
6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address
its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its
component members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on
which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be
the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the
applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification
by all the contracting States
4 2 in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
Article 6(1) EU demands respect of the following principles: "liberty, democracy, respect for human rights[,] and fundamental freedoms, and the Rule of Law[,] .. .which are common to the Member
States."43
40. For a summary of such developments on the world scale, see Robert

Wintemute, Conclusion to

LEGAL RECOGNITION

OF SAME-SEX

STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,

PARTNERSHIPS:

A

supra note 14, at 759,

761.
41. For a summary of national legal developments related to gay rights in Europe,
see Kees Waaldijk, Towards the Recognition of Same-Sex Partnersin European Union
Law: Expectations Based on Trends in National Law, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 14, at 635, 649-50.
42. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 49, Dec. 24, 2002,
2002 O.J. (C 325) 5, 31.
43. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6(1), Dec. 24,
2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 5, 11.
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Through providing some general guidance as to who may apply to
join the EU and which institutions are involved in dealing with the
applications, article 49 EU does not contain any detailed procedure
for how enlargements of the EU are to be regulated. In practice, enlargement law comes down to a set of enlargement principles and application criteria. 44 The application criteria should be met at the time
of the submission of the application for membership to the Council of
the European Union ("Council"). If this is not the case, the question
of adhering to the principles cannot even be raised-the application
made by a state that does not meet the criteria would be immediately
rejected (as happened with Morocco 4 5) or left unanswered (as in the
case of Franco's Spain 46 ). Similarly, once a country ceases to meet the
application criteria for some reason, the process immediately comes to
a halt (similar to what happened to Greek association in 196747). A
situation might arise when an applicant country meets the formal criteria but is not ready to adhere to the principles or might be ready to
adhere to the principles but does not meet the application criteria. In
both such cases, enlargement is impossible. Thus, taking this distinction into account, Hillion's view that a country "can be eligible but not
admissible ' 48 (and vice versa) becomes clear.
Having met all the application criteria, the countries joining in the
fifth enlargement were all clearly eligible to enter the EU. The criteria, 49 as outlined in article 49(1) EU included statehood, Europeanness, and sharing the principles of article 6(1) EU. Scholarly literature
also regards membership of the Council of Europe (CoE) 50 as a necessary criterion,5 t which is justifiable given the wording of article 6(2)
44. For a brief analysis, with further references, of the EU enlargement law, see
Kochenov, supra note 36.
45. Id. at 29 n.15.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id. The application of the Association Agreement with Greece was frozen
after the coup d'Etat of the colonels. Id.; see 1963 J.O. (L 26) 93.
48. Christophe Hillion, Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis, in
ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 411 (Anthony Arnull
& Daniel Wincott eds., 2002); Christophe Hillion, The Copenhagen Criteriaand Their
Progeny, in EU ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH 19 (Christophe Hillion ed.,
2004).
49. For the evolution of the criteria and their analysis, see Kochenov, supra note
36, at 9-11.
50. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, Europ. T.S. No. 1. Accessions
to the CoE are regulated by art. 4 of the Statute and presuppose ratification of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as Amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 4,
1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
51. See Koen Lenaerts, Fundamental Rights in the European Union, 25 EUR. L.
REV. 575, 599 (2000); Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in
Europe, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 95, 97 (Winter 2003); TuCNY, supra note 37, at
28.
468
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EU, the views of the candidate countries,52 and the common goals the
CoE shares with the EU.53
Accepting the principles of enlargement appeared more challenging
for the CEECs.5 4 Traditionally, EU enlargement law knows two main
principles-full and unconditional acceptance of the acquis communautaire,5 5 including the goals of the Community/Union and the
options open for development,56 and the limited duration and reach of
the transitional periods. Tout court, the new-comers cannot deviate
from the acquis and are unable to change the Treaties.57 Not following directly from the text of article 49 EU, these principles stem from
the very nature of the Community and form the core component of
the Community method.58
B.

Conditionality Principle

The fifth enlargement saw an important change in the structure of
principles, namely, a new conditionality principle was added. The EU
reserved itself a right to assess the level of preparedness for accession
of those countries willing to join, analyzing their economic status as
well as their record in the field of human rights, democracy, and the
52. TUCNY, supra note 37, at 28.
53. The EU and CoE accession criteria are also quite similar. On the CoE enlargement law, see EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB., Resolution 1115 (1997) Setting Up of an
Assembly Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member
States of the Council of Europe, 5th Sess., Doc. No. 1115 (1997); EUR. PARL. Ass.
DEB., Order No. 485 on the General Policy of the Council of Europe, 25th Sess., Doc.
No. 6744 (1993); EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB., Order No. 488 on the Honouringof Commitments Entered Into by New Member States, 39th Sess., Doc. No. 6882 (1993); EUR.
PARL. Ass. DEB., Resolution 917 on a Special Guest Status with the Parliamentary
Assembly, 5th Sess., Doc. No. 6036 (1989); EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB., Resolution 1031 on
the Honouring of Commitments Entered Into by Member States When Joining the
Council of Europe, 14th Sess., Doc. No. 7037 (1994); see also Commission Pour le
Respect des Obligations et Engagements des Etats Membres du Conseil de l'Europe
(Commission de Suivi) (Nov. 8, 2005), http://assembly.coe.int/committee/MON/
RoleF.htm. See also Dimitry Kochenov, An Argument for Closer Cooperation between the European Union and the Council of Europe in the Field of EU Enlargement
Regulation, 2 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR. L. & POL'Y 311 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=953960.
54. For the analysis of enlargement principles, see Kochenov, supra note 36, at
11-16.
55. See L.J. Brinkhorst & M.J. Kuiper, The Integration of the New Member States
in the Community Legal Order, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 364, 365, 372 (1972); Marc
Maresceau, The EU Pre-Accession Strategies: A Political and Legal Analysis, in THE
EU's ENLARGEMENT AND MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3 (Marc Maresceau & Erwan Lanon eds., 2001).
56. This position has first been articulated by Pierre Pescatore. PIERRE PESCATORE, LE DROIT DE L'INT8GRATION 29 (A.W. Sijthoff - Leiden 1972).
57. For some exceptions, see Kochenov, supra note 36, at 32 n.54.
58. See CHRISTOPHER PRESTON, ENLARGEMENT AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 18 (1997); Christopher Preston, Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The
Classical Community Method and the Prospects for a Wider Europe, 33 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 451, 456-57 (1995).
A.
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rule of law. To a considerable extent, the origins of the principle lie in
the specific character of the fifth enlargement round, which was not
exactly like the previous rounds, due to both the sheer number of applicants5 9 and the nature of the majority of the newcomers, most of
whom were ex-Communist states. The essence of the new principle
was first formulated in the Copenhagen criteria released by the European Council. According to the criteria:
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of
a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic
and monetary union.6 °
Such an approach is a logical one-the best way to ensure the success of political and economic reforms in the transition countries
wanting to join is to control their progress, which was done through
the newly introduced pre-accession strategy concept. 6 In light of this
progress-control idea, the EU established a formal link between the
achievement of certain standards in the development of the economy,
public administration, human rights protection, and other spheres; and
the benefits the applicants could acquire from the EU. Among those
benefits were various types of aid and assistance 62 and the ultimate
59. See Maresceau, supra note 55, at 3.
60. Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council (June 21-22, 1993),
No. SN180/1/93. See Dimitry Kochenov, Behind the Copenhagen Facade: The Meaning and Structure of the Copenhagen Political Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of
Law, 8 EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 10 (2004), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/

2004-010.htm; see also EU ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH, supra note 48.
61. HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT 103-04 (Andrea Ott & Kirstyn
Inlgis eds., 2002); LAURENT BEURDELEY, L'ELARGISSEMENT DE L'UNION
EUROPEENNE AUX PAYS D'EUROPE CENTRALE ET ORIENTALE ET AUX
MtDITERRANtEN 43 (L'Harmattan 2003); Hillion (2002), supra note

ILES

DU BASSIN

48, 414.
62. These benefits were (1) mainly the PHARE programme applying to Poland
and Hungary, Council Regulation 3906/89, 1989 O.J. (L 375) 11 (EC); GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia, Council Regulation 2698/90, 1990 O..
(L 257) 1 (EC); Albania, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, Council Regulation 3800/91,
1991 O.J. (L 357) 10 (EC); Slovenia, Council Regulation 2334/92, 1992 O.. (L 227) 1
(EC); Croatia, Council Regulation 1366/95, 1995 O.J. (L 133) 1 (EC); and FYROM,
Council Regulation 463/96, 1996 O.. (L 65) 3 (EC); (2) the SAPARD programme,
providing assistance in the agricultural sector, Council Regulation 1268/1999, 1999
O.J. (L 161) 87 (EC); and (3) the ISPA programme, providing assistance in the fields
of transport and environment, Council Regulation 1267/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 161) 73
(EC). PHARE, SAPARD, and ISPA are united in a single legal framework, Council
Regulation 1267/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 161) 68 (EC). See also Council Regulation 622/98,
1998 O.J. (L 85) 1 (EC) (introducing Accession Partnerships and making the receipt
of the pre-accession aid conditional on the pre-accession progress). On pre-accession
assistance, see Marc Maresceau, Pre-Accession, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 12 (Marise Cremona ed., 2003); Alain Guggenbijhl & Margareta
Theelen, The FinancialAssistance of the European Union to Its Eastern and Southe ,O
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culmination of CEECs, that is, an eventual accession to the EU.
Therefore, the EU was acting in a twofold role, both as an "[a]id
[dionor and [c]lub [o]wner. "63
The conditionality principle allowed the EU to carry out an "impartial assessment" of the applicants' progress towards accession. In
other words, theoretically, the assessment of progress conducted by
the European Commission ("Commission") on behalf of the EU was
supposed to be based uniquely on the performance of the candidate
countries and to be free of any political considerations, resulting in
depoliticisation of the process of enlargement.64 Consequently, only
the most prepared candidates get a chance to join the EU. In practice,
however, conditionality hardly makes accession more predictable and
clear. 65 The overall effectiveness of the conditionality principle, at
least in the field of gay rights, is very doubtful.
C.

Legal Instruments of Conditionality

Standing alone, the Copenhagen Criteria were only able to set the
most general pre-accession conditionality framework, unable to ensure the day-to-day application of the principle. As far as gay rights
were concerned, the Criteria did not make any special mention of
them at all. Some further legal and political instruments were clearly
needed to make the Copenhagen Criteria operational. Responding to
this need, a sophisticated framework of Copenhagen-related documents was devised. These instruments, put at the disposal of the
Community institutions, provided an ensemble of tools for checking
the level of the candidate countries' preparedness for accession and
aimed at providing the necessary information on the basis of which
the most important decisions leading to enlargement were to be made.
Due to lack of space, the Copenhagen-related documents cannot be
described here in detail, though such analysis can be found elsewhere. 66 In short, the Copenhagen-related documents represent a system of eight different types of legal-political instruments designed
with a view to effectively implement the Copenhagen Criteria, making
the conditionality principle workable. These documents include:
(1) Commission Opinions on the countries' applications for accession (every country's application is assessed in a separate
Opinion);
Neighbours: A ComparativeAnalysis, in THE EU's
NEAN STRATEGIES:

A

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

ENLARGEMENT AND MEDITERRA-

217 (Marc Maresceau & Erwan Lan-

non eds., 2001).
63. Heather Grabbe, European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire, 23 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 249, 253 (2002).
64. For the main criteria of a "depoliticised enlargement process," see K. Engelbrekt, Multiple Asymmetries: The European Union's Neo-Byzantine Approach to

Eastern Enlargement, 39

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

42 (2002).

65. Hillion (2002), supra note 48, 402; Kochenov, supra note 60.
66. Kochenov, supra note 60.
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(2) Agenda 2000 (a general document accompanying the individual
Opinions and outlining the overall enlargement strategy);
(3) Commission Regular Reports on the candidate countries' progress towards accession. The progress made by each candidate
country is analysed in a separate Report (released annually following the Opinions);
(4) Commission Composite (Strategy) Papers, summarising the
findings of the country Reports (released annually together
with the Reports);
(5) Comprehensive Country Monitoring Reports, dealing individually with the reform progress in every acceding country (released between the signing of the Treaty of Accession and the
actual accession of a given country to the EU);
(6) Comprehensive Monitoring Report (summarising the findings
of all the Comprehensive Country Monitoring Reports);
(7) Accession Partnerships (APs), released by the Council in the
form of Decisions based on the Commission's proposals and
outlining a clear set of priority areas each candidate country is
to work on in order to progress towards accession;
(8) White Papers dealing with the problems of certain candidate
countries (especially Bulgaria and Romania).6 7
Since the formulation of the conditionality principle by the European Council in 1993 (Copenhagen), the evolution of the Copenhagen-related documents has made considerable progress to establishing
a fairly rigid legal framework for its application. This progress particularly came to life through the adoption of the APs, introduced by the
European Council in 1997 (Luxembourg). Regulation 622/98, allowing for the adoption of the APs, stipulated that the candidate
countries' pre-accession progress and eligibility for EU funding was
directly related to their ability to meet the priorities set in the APs and
the Copenhagen Criteria (as interpreted in other Copenhagen-related
documents). 68 Article 4 of the Regulation established that "when the
commitments contained in the Europe Agreement are not respected
and/or progress towards fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria is insufficient, the Council ... may take appropriate steps with regard to

69
any pre-accession assistance granted to an applicant State.
Thus, Regulation 622/98 moved the whole pre-accession exercise
from the field of enlargement politics7 ° into the spotlight of the law,

67. All the aforementioned documents are available online at the Commission's
enlargement webpage, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key documents/index-archive
_en.htm.
68. Council Regulation 622/98, 1998 O.J. (L 85) 1 (EC).
69. Council Regulation 622/98 art. 4, 1998 O.J. (L 85) 1 (EC).
70. In the context of the 2nd enlargement, the ECJ deemed enlargement regulation too political to intervene. See Case 93/78, Mattheus v. Doego Fruchtimport und
Tiefkuhlkost eG, 1978 E.C.R. 2203. There is still no comparable case-law in the context of the 5th enlargement after Regulation 622/98 was adopted.
472
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making the Copenhagen Criteria legally enforceable. 7 1 The Copenhagen-related documents and the Copenhagen Criteria themselves thus
instantly became legal instruments, providing the Commission with
sufficient legal (as opposed to purely political) grounds to freeze accession progress of a country failing to respect the requirements contained in these documents (at least as far as the financing of the preaccession projects was concerned). As a result, the implementation of
the conditionality principle came to include both sticks and carrotsthe well-behaved candidate countries were entitled to financial assistance while those disregarding their obligations under the principle
could be subjected to the effects of article 4 of Regulation 622/98. The
potential effectiveness of such a complex approach is difficult to
dispute.7 2
III.

THE ISSUE OF PRE-ACCESSION COMPETENCESTRANSCENDING THE SCOPE OF THE

AcQuis

In order to make effective use of the Copenhagen-related documents and thus fully implement the principle of conditionality while
assessing the state of the candidate countries' development, especially
in the fields of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights protection, the EU, while conducting the accession process, had to rid itself
of its inherent competence limitations. Being a supranational organisation7 3 enjoying limited sovereignty based on the powers transferred
to it from the Member States, 4 the scope of Community competences
71. Kirstyn Inglis, The Europe Agreements Compared in the Light of Their PreAccession Reorientation, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1173, 1186 (2000).

72. The number of different types of Copenhagen-related documents of potentially varying effectiveness available to the Commission made it possible to combine
them in different ways in order to implement the conditionality principle better, making the pre-accession exercise more flexible. On the critique of such combinations of
different tools, see Dimitry Kochenov, EU Enlargement:Flexible Compliance with the
Commission's Pre-Accession Demands and Schnittke's Ideas on Music (The Ctr. for
the Study of Eur. Pol. & Soc'y 2005, Working Paper), available at http://hsf.bgu.ac.il/
europe/index.aspx?pgid=pg_127842651974615376; Dimitry Kochenov, Why the Promotion of the Acquis Is not the Same as the Promotion of Democracy and What can be
Done in Order also to Promote Democracy instead of Just Promoting the Acquis, 2
Hanse L. Rev. 171 (2006), http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf4/Vol2No2Art02.pdf.

73. In the scholarly literature, the principle was formulated in the middle of the
last century. See

(1966);

KLAUS

PETER HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
LINDEINER-WILDAU, LA SUPRANATIONALITI
EN TANT QUE

VON

DROIT (A.W. Sijthoff - Leyde 1970). On the summary of the relation
between supranationality and sovereignty in Community law, see Dimitry Kochenov,

PRINCIPE DE

The Case of the EC: Peaceful Coexistence of an Ever Powerful Community and Sovereign Member States?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GOVERNANCE 243 (Francis

Synder ed., 2003).
74. The idea of delegation of powers and limitation of national sovereignty is very
well articulated in the case-law of the ECJ. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L,
1964 E.C.R. 585; Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming
Van Gend & Loos v. Neth. Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 1, § I B. It also
found a reflection in the Constitutions of the Member States. See Bruno de Witte.73

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

15

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 13 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 8

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

is limited, as stated in article 5 EC, to the areas in which the competences have been transferred to it.75 This limitation was emphasized
by the ECJ at a very early stage of integration7 6 and has most definitely brought itself to the fore in the Tobacco Advertising case77-a
European analogue of U.S. v. Lopez.7 8 Moreover, according to the
last sentence of article 5 EC, "[a]ny action by the Community shall not
go beyond
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this
79
Treaty."
Created to strive to achieve the objectives set out in the Treaties,
the Community does not therefore have general legislative competence. As a consequence, the majority of elements included into the
Copenhagen political criteria of democracy, the rule of law, and the
protection of human rights, lie in fields where the Community is powerless. In other words, the acquis communautaire is of little use for
the conduct of any substantial analysis of the candidate countries'
compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. Thus, where limited by the scope of the acquis, the EU can hardly be effective in applying the conditionality principle since the majority of the candidate
countries' problem areas, including the core of gay rights and nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, simply lie outside the
scope of the acquis.
The substance of the Copenhagen Criteria coupled with the interpretation of article 5 EC in the light of article 6(1) EU allows the
conclusion that article 5 EC competence limitations did not actually
apply to the pre-accession application of the principle of conditionality. An analogy with the internal-external competence split existing in
the field of human rights protection reinforces such conclusion. 80
ConstitutionalAspects of European Union Membership in the Original Six Member
States: Model Solutions for the Applicant Countries?, in EU ENLARGEMENT: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPACT AT EU AND NATIONAL LEVEL 65, 68 (Alfred E. Kellermann et al. eds., 2001). The new Member States that joined the Union in 2004
amended their Constitutions to make such delegations possible. ANNELI ALBI, EU
ENLARGEMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
75. See Alan Dashwood, The Limits of European Community Powers, 21 EUR. L.
REV. 113 (1996).
76. See Case 111/63, Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v. High Auth. of the ECSC, 1965
E.C.R. 677.
77. Case C-74/99, R. v. Sec'y of State for Health ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd.,
2000 E.C.R. 1-8599; Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament, 2000
E.C.R. 1-8419.
78. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 567-68 (1995) (holding that
when Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Congress exceeded the authority conferred to it by the United States Constitution).
79. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Dec. 29, 2006, art. 5, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 37, 46.
80. In the sphere of human rights protection, the external competences are much
broader than the internal ones. See Philip Alston & J.H.H. Weiler, An 'Ever Closer
Union' in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights, in
THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 8 (Philip Alston ed., 1999); Andrew Clapham, 474
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The wording of the Copenhagen Criteria (especially taken together
with the Copenhagen-related documents) is much broader in scope
than the acquis communautaire. For instance, there is no acquis on
minority protection,8 1 the naturalization policies of the Member
rule of law.8 3 When asked to check the state of minorStates, 812 or the rul1o
ity protection in the candidate countries, the Commission obviously
could not rely on the non-existent acquis. The fact that the Copenhagen-related documents contain assessments of developments in areas
falling outside the acquis proves that the EU did not feel restrained by
article 5 EC limitations in the course of the pre-accession. This is justified by the interpretation of articles 49 and 6(1) EU in conjunction
with article 5 EC. Given the broad wording of Article 6(1) EU, it
would be logical to presuppose that the standard of democracy, the
rule of law, and human rights are not per se confined to the sphere of
Community/Union competences. Moreover, since Article 6(1) EU is
employed (as required by a reference made to it from Article 49 EU)
as a "gate-keeper" of the Community to ensure that only democratic
states respecting human rights join, limiting its reach to the issues covered by the acquis would be contrary to its very purpose and would
fail to ensure the effective functioning of the EU's enlargement law as
envisaged by the framers. In other words, whatever the scope of gay
rights acquis, in the context of pre-accession, the EU was competent
to promote gay rights protection and non-discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation as it saw fit.

IV.

GAY RIGHTS IN THE COPENHAGEN-RELATED DOCUMENTS

A.

Overall Picture

Clearly, to agree with Koppelman, "[s]o many things are wrong with
laws that discriminate against gay people that it is hard to know where
Human Rights Policy of the European Community, 10 Y.B. EUR. L. 309 (1990); Dominic McGoldrick, The EU After Amsterdam: An Organisation with General Human
Rights Competence?, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE AMSTERDAM TREATY 249 (David
O'Keeffe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999).
81. See Gabriel von Toggenburg, A Rough Orientation Through a Delicate Relationship: The European Union's Endeavoursfor (Its) Minorities, 4 EUR. INTEGRATION
ONLINE PAPERS 16 (2000), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-016.htm; Christophe Hillion, Enlargement of the European Union - the Discrepancybetween Membership Obligations and Accession Conditions as Regards the Protection of Minorities, 27
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 715 (2004).
82. Case C-369/90, Micheletti v. Delegaci6n del Gobierno en Cantabria, 1992
E.C.R. 1-4239, T 10. Nevertheless, naturalisation played a role in the pre-accession as
part of the minority protection Copenhagen criterion. Dimitry Kochenov, Pre-accession, Naturalization, and "Due regard to Community Law": The European Union's
"Steering" of National Citizenship Policies in Candidate Countries during the Fifth
Enlargement, 4 ROMANIAN J. POLITICAL Sci. 71 (2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=926851.
83. See generally MARIA LUISA FERNANDEZ ESTEBAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
Al
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION (1999).
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to begin."84 The Commission was facing the same problem and resolved it in a somewhat disappointing way. The analysis of the Co-

penhagen-related documents demonstrates with clarity that gay rights
did not play a crucial role in the course of the pre-accession exercise.

Moreover, the beginning of the fifth enlargement preparation was
marked by an almost total disregard of gay rights. Although the situation changed slightly with the Regular Reports released after 2000, the
standard of gay rights protection promoted in the Copenhagen-related

documents was very low and the criticism of the non-performing
countries inconsistent.
Commission Opinions (1997) on the CEECs' applications for acces-

sion announced that all the countries besides Slovakia 85 protected
human rights sufficiently and found that they met the Copenhagen
political criteria of democracy, the rule of law, the protection of
human rights, and the respect for and protection of minorities.8 6 This

recognition came about notwithstanding the fact that one of these
countries de facto criminalised consensual, same-sex relations between
adults,8 7 had criminal legislation establishing different ages of consent
applying to homosexual and heterosexual relationships,8 8 and did not
outlaw discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Needless to
say, same-sex unions and the recognition of other substantial gay

rights were unknown to the legal systems of candidate countries. The
hostility of a great majority of the population of the CEECs towards
homosexuals made the position of gays in Eastern Europe even more
difficult.8 9 Moreover, churches gaining influence after the fall of communism, often embraced an openly homophobic position.9"
84. Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex DiscriminationArgument for Lesbian
and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519, 519 (2001).
85. Me~iar's Slovakia had a much worse democracy and human rights record compared to other CEECs. See M. Steven Fish, A Vladimir Mediar Retrospective: The
End of Mediarism, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REV. (1999), available at http://
www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol8numl-2/special/endofmec.html.
86. See all the 1997 Commission Opinions. The Commission only used the term
"minorities" to refer to ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, assessing gay rights
exclusively in the sections of the Copenhagen-related documents dealing with human
rights protection.
87. Such legislation was in force in Romania until 2001. See COMM'N EUR.
CMTYS., 2001 Regular Report on Romania's Progress Towards Accession 23 (2001).
See also discussion infra Part IV.B.
88. 2001 Reports recognised that age-of-consent discrimination existed in Bulgaria
and Hungary and welcomed the abolition of difference in the age of consent in Lithuania. See COMM'N EUR. CMTYS., 2001 Regular Report on Bulgaria'sProgressTowards
Accession 22 (2001); COMM'N EUR. CMTYs., 2001 Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Towards Accession 21 (2001); COMM'N EUR. CMTYs., 2001 Regular Report on
Lithuania's Progress Towards Accession 22 (2001).
89. See Torra, supra note 3, at 73.
90. To provide an example, the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church
met before the discussion of the law decriminalising homosexual acts in the
Romanian Senate, and instructed its spokesman, Archbishop Nifon, to ask the-
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In this context, the recognition by the Commission that the applicant countries met the Copenhagen human rights protection criteria
came as a body blow to gay rights activists. If criminalisation of homosexual acts could not prevent a country from being regarded as
providing sufficient protection of human rights to qualify as meeting
the Copenhagen Criteria, then what could? Upon the release of the
Opinions, the functionality of the Copenhagen Criteria as such (at
least as applied) could legitimately be questioned. The EU that positioned itself (also before the European East "coming back to Europe") as a fierce protector of human rights could legitimately be
expected to do much more in this domain.
The recognition that the applicant countries met the requirements
of the Copenhagen political criteria as early as in 1997 contradicted
the commitment towards gay rights protection confirmed on numerous occasions by the members of the Commission. So Mr. Flynn, writing on behalf of the Commission, confirmed as early as 1996 that
"[t]he issue of the eradication of discrimination on grounds of sexual
orientation is directly linked to the broader issue of fundamental
rights and freedoms," 9 1 thus, placing this type of discrimination within
the scope of the Copenhagen political criteria. Later on, this position
was confirmed by Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen. Talking
about nondiscrimination against homosexuals, the Commissioner
stated that this principle "not only reflect[s] the basic principles of the
Union, but also the basic principles that new Member States will be
expected to accept upon accession," continuing that "[t]he Commission is fully committed to ensuring that this condition for accession is
respected." 92 In line with the Commission, the European Parliament
(EP) also declared that it would never support the accession of any
country "that, through its legislation or policies, violates the human
rights of lesbians and gay men."9 3
In the course of the pre-accession process, the Commission mostly
focused on two issues related to gay rights-the decriminalisation of
homosexual acts and the equalisation of the age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual relationships. These two issues were accompanied by a number of relatively minor ones, such as removing the
prohibition of "homosexual actions in public" and the differential
treatment of homosexual and heterosexual prostitution. During the
last years of pre-accession, the issue of the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was also included in the Reports, coming down to a requirement of "revolutionary" changes in
Romanian President not to sign such a bill into law. Turcescu & Stan, supra note 1,
294.
91. Written Question 2224/96, 1996 O.J. (C 365) 95.
92. Written Question E-4142/00, 2001 O.J. (C 235 E) 78, 79.
93. Resolution on Equal Rights for Gays and Lesbians in the EC, 1998 O.J. (C
313) 186, J.
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the national legislation of the candidate countries.9 4 However, it was
not assessed among the human rights issues since it belonged to the
area of the transposition of the acquis, initially arising from the adoption of the Equal Treatment Directive. In other words, the announcement that the applicant countries met the Copenhagen political
criteria in 1997 did not mark the end of the pre-accession gay rights
monitoring. On the contrary, the Reports that followed tended to pay
increasing attention to gay rights protection.
B.

DecriminalisingHomosexual Acts-The Example of Romania

The most far-reaching gay rights violations were recorded by the
Commission in Romania. Providing an especially worrisome example,
this country merits a separate assessment.
Romania stood apart among the candidate countries due to its particularly dubious human rights record in the field of gay rights." This
country only decriminalised homosexual acts in 2001.96 Its persistent
unwillingness to do so attracted the special attention of whistle-blowers within both the CoE 9 7 and the EU framework.9 8 In fact, Romania
promised to decriminalise homosexual acts on joining the CoE in
1993. Instead of repealing article 200 of its Criminal Code, which
criminalised homosexual acts among consenting adults, Romania
amended the article adding a "public scandal" clause. 99 Homosexual
acts were to be prosecuted only on causing a "public scandal," which
was defined by the authorities as follows: "two or more people know
that an act occurred and disapprove of it."' 10 To make the overall
picture even grimmer, homosexual associations were also prohibited.
Such an amendment did not satisfy the CoE and was criticised in Resolution 1123 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu94. For the example of Bulgaria, see D. Mihajlova, Zakonat za zageita sregeu diskriminatsijata kato instrument za zagita na _ertvite na neravno tretirane, osnovano na
priznaka seksualna orientatsija,in ANTIDISKRIMINATSIONNOTO ZAKONODATELSTVO V
BALGARIJA: ISTORIJA I RAZVITIJE (Evropejski Institut ed., 2005), available at http://
diversity.europe.bg/page.php?category=309&id=1739.
95. See Turcescu & Stan, supra note 1, at 292-98; Torra, supra note 3, at 79-80.
96. COMM'N EUR. CMTYS., 2001 Regular Report on Romania's Progress Towards
Accession 23 (2001). Once put into the context of international developments, the
Romanian gay rights record does not look that grim. The U.S. Supreme Court only
invalidated a statute prohibiting homosexual acts in 2003. Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
97. See Reply to Written Question No. 367 to the Committee of Ministers by Mr.
Van der Maelen: "HomosexualRights in Romania", COM (2003) 367 final (Mar. 31,
2003); Reply from the Committee of Minister to Written Question No. 364 by Mr. Van
der Maelen: "Homosexual Rights in Romania", COM (1996) 364 (Apr. 12, 1996).
98. See Written Question E-4142/00, supra note 87; Written Question E-2754/96,
1997 O.J. (C 105) 24; see also Resolution on Stiffer Penalties for Homosexuals in
Romania, 1996 O.J. (C 320) 197.
99. This amendment came as a consequence of the Constitutional Court ruling
No. 81 of July 15, 1995.
A-7
100. Torra, supra note 3, at 80 n.18.
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rope. 10 1 CoE criticism did not produce any results and was supported
in 1997 by the Commission's Opinion.10 2 Later, the Commission continued pointing out the need to bring the Criminal Code "in line with
European standards."' 1 3 Nevertheless, Romania's unwillingness to
cooperate10 4 did not prevent it from meeting the Copenhagen
Criteria.
A strange situation has transpired-a state criminalising homosexual acts was announced to have satisfied the Copenhagen Criteria of
gay rights protection. The situation was only changed in 2001, four
years after the first demands of the European Commission and eight
years after Romania's accession to the CoE. The case of Romania is
an excellent illustration of the paradoxical nature of the Copenhagen
Criteria in relation to gay rights. The threshold of meeting the Criteria was so low that it did not require a candidate country to
decriminalise homosexual acts.
C.

Combating Age-of-Consent Discrimination

As noted above, the criminal codes of a number of candidate countries created a situation where homosexuals suffered discrimination
even without a blanket ban on homosexual acts. The Commission,
supported by the European Parliament,10 5 stressed the need to remove the discriminatory provisions from the criminal codes in a number of Copenhagen-related documents. 0 6 In the context of preaccession, such demands looked slightly odd set against a climate
where no consensus existed among the EU-15 Member States regarding the level of gay rights protection. Notably, age-of-consent discrim0 7 and the UK abolished it only under
ination still existed in Greece,"
10 8
ECt.HR.
pressure from the
The candidate countries' response to the Commission's criticism in
this sphere varied-it took Bulgaria one year to change its Penal Code
101. EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB., Resolutionl123 (1997) on Honouring of Obligations
and Commitments byRomania, 14th Sess., Doc. No. 1123 (1997). All the CoE documents are available online at http://www.coe.int/.
102. Commission Opinion on Romania's Application for Membership of the European Union, COM (1997) 18 final, at 16.
103. COMM'N EUR. CMTYS., 2000 Regular Report From the Commission on
Romania's Progress Towards Accession 21 (2001).
104. See a paradox discussed supra Part III.A.
105. European Parliament Resolution on Respect for Human Rights in the European Union (1998-1999), 2000 O.J. (C 377) 344, T 76.
106. See, e.g., COMM'N EUR. CMTYS., 2001 Regular Report on Bulgaria's Progress
Towards Accession 22 (2001).
107. Langenkamp, supra note 2, at 465 n. 150.
108. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1983); Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 479
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and thus eliminate discrimination." 9 Estonia amended its Criminal
Code even without a demand from the Commission." Notwithstand-

ing the criticism of the Commission, Hungary did not amend its Code
Consequently, the Hungarian Constiduring the reporting period.'
tutional Court intervened to declare the provisions of the Penal Code
concerning the difference in the age of consent unconstitutional."' In
its 2002 Report, the Commission noted the fact that discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation was institutionalised in the Hungarian
armed forces.' 1 3 Surprisingly, the Commission only mentioned this

fact without criticising Hungary for this policy, which amounts to a
breach of the ECt.HR"

a

and Directive 2000/78/EC." 5

D. Illegal Differential Treatment of the Candidate Countries
Overall, the Commission failed to treat all the candidate countries
equally during the pre-accession reporting exercise. In the fourth re-

porting round (2000) for example, the Commission, focusing solely on
gay rights in Romania and Cyprus, did not even mention the issue of
age-of-consent discrimination against homosexuals existing in other
candidate countries, thus creating an illusion that the situation elsewhere was acceptable, which was not the case. According to the European Parliament, such discrimination also existed in Bulgaria,
Estonia, Hungary, and Lithuania." 6 Therefore, the Commission
clearly failed to raise the same set of issues in its assessments of differ-

ent countries without providing any justification for such a position.
Such treatment of the candidate countries was in blunt contradiction to the principle of equal treatment of the candidate countries and
the milestone idea behind the conditionality principle, namely that of
109. COMM'N EuR. CMTYS., 2002 Regular Report on Bulgaria's Progress Towards
Accession 30 (2002).
110. See COMM'N EUR. CMTYS., 2001 RegularReport on Estonia'sProgress Towards
Accession 21 (2001). Responding most probably, to the call of the Eurpoean Parliament "to remove from ... penal codes all laws[,] which entail discrimination against
lesbians and homosexuals." See European Parliament Resolution on Respect for
Human Rights in the European Union, supra note 100, at 76.
111. COMM'N EUR. CMTys., 2001 Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Towards
Accession 21 (2001).
112. COMM'N EUR. CMTYS., 2002 Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Towards
Accession 29 (2002); see Renata Uitz, Hungary: Mixed Prospects for the Constitutionalization of Gay Rights, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 705, 707 (2004).
113. COMM'N EUR. CMTYS., 2002 Regular Report on Hungary's Progress Towards
Accession 29 (2002).
114. See Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31417 & 32377/96, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1999); Smith v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985 & 33986/96, 1999-VI Eur. Ct.
H.R. 9 111-12.
4 does not
115. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16, 19
include sexual orientation or gender among the grounds of possible derogation regarding service in the armed forces.
116. European Parliament Resolution on Respect for Human Rights in the EuroAQ(
pean Union, supra note 100, at 76.
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accession based on merits. This largely unbalanced approach to the
assessment of pre-accession progress was coupled with the Commission's limited use of all the legal instruments of pressure available to
it, resulting in its de facto inability to push the candidate countries to
reform legislation in this domain. This made the European Parliament, anxious about a dubious situation in this area of enlargement
preparation, urge the Council to raise the question of discrimination
against homosexuals during the membership negotiations.1 17 The EP
also addressed the candidate countries directly, urging
them to abolish
18
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.'
Most importantly, the proactive role of the European Parliament, as
a tireless advocate of putting gay rights on the pre-accession agenda,
resulted in the reversing of the Commission's unwillingness to acknowledge and criticise the candidate countries' numerous problems
in this domain. In other words, the European Parliament played an
important role in assuring that the accession process both withstood
the challenge of confronting the candidate countries with their own
problems in the field of gay rights and ensured that the principle of
conditionality was properly applied. The EP stepped into the spotlight of enlargement regulation at a time when the Commission had
failed to ensure that the accession process would be evaluative and
inclusive, and that all the candidate countries would "join the European Union on the basis of the same criteria and .. .on an equal
footing."' 1 9 The Estonian example is very telling in this respect-this
country abolished discriminatory provisions after the "general" call
of
1 20
the EP even without any specific criticism from the Commission.
To summarise-being free to promote any standard, the EU opted
for advancing two basic requirements, decriminalisation of homosexual acts and equality of ages of consent for heterosexual and homosexual acts in criminal law of the candidate countries. Overall, the role
played by gay rights in the course of the pre-accession was minimal,
corresponding to the timid and often inconsistent demands of the
Commission.
117. European Parliament Resolution on the Annual Report on International
Human Rights and European Union Human Rights Policy, 1999, 2000 O.J. (C 377)
336, 28.
118. See European Parliament Resolution on the Enlargement of the European
Union B5-0538/2001, 2002 O.J. (C 72 E) 165, 55; European Parliament Resolution
on Lithuania's Application for Membership of the European Union and the State of
Negotiations A5-0253/2001, 2002 O.J. (C 72 E) 173, 5; European Parliament Resolution on Hungary's Application for Membership of the European Union and the
State of Negotiations A5-0257/2001, 2002 O.J. (C 72 E) 191,
14; European Parliament Resolution on Bulgaria's Application for Membership of the European Union
and the State of Negotiations A5-0258/2001, 2002 O.J. (C 72 E) 194,
9; European
Parliament Resolution on Romania's Application for Membership of the European
Union and the State of Negotiations A5-0259/2001, 2002 O.J. (C 72 E) 200, 6.
119. Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 10 (Dec. 12-13, 1997).
120. See sources cited supra note 105.
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THE GAY RIGHTS AcouIs AND THE PROMOTION OF GAY
RIGHTS IN THE PRE-ACCESSION PROCESS

The history of gay rights acquis is marked by recent changes and
can be divided into two main phases. The adoption of Directive 2000/
78/EC serves as a separator between the two.
A.

Nonexistent Gay Rights Acquis Before the Adoption of the
Equality Directive

Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which introduced article 13 into the EC Treaty, the Union had little to boast of
in the field of gay rights and nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. On the one hand, as was also confirmed in the course of
enlargement preparation, the Union was committed to respecting gay
rights, regarding them as part of human rights; 121 on the other hand,
the Union did not have any competences in this domain and thus
could not legislate to prohibit sexual-orientation discrimination. Even
the EP's commitment to gay rights could not change the situation.
The pre-Amsterdam status quo in this field is excellently summarised
by Commissioner Flynn: "At present the Treaty on European Union
does not confer specific powers on the institutions to eradicate discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.' ' 122 Article 13 EC provided the Community with a tool to change this situation, enabling the
of combating discriminainstitutions to legislate, inter alia in the field
12 3
tion, on the basis of sexual orientation.
In fact, it can be argued that potentially the Community was not
absolutely powerless in this domain even before article 13 EC was
introduced into the Treaty. In defence of this claim, it is necessary to
turn to the ECt.HR, which possesses "special significance "121 in Community law, providing, according to article 6(2) EU and ECJ caselaw, 12 a source of principles of Community law. The Convention, although not directly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, was interpreted by the ECt.HR in such a way that certain
gay rights fell within the scope of its article 8.126 Moreover, the
121. Written Question 2224/96, supra note 86.
122. Written Question 2224/96, 1996 O.J. (C 356) 95; see Written Question 2133/83,
1984 O.J. (C 173) 9; Written Question 2134/83, 1984 O.J. (C 152) 25.
123. See Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC).
124. See Case C-299/95, Kremzow v. Austria, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2629, 1 14; Case C-260/
89, Elliniki Radiophonia Til6orassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis, 1991 E.C.R.
1-2925, 41.
125. See Case C-185/97, Coote v. Granada Hospitality Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-5199,
21-23; Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
1986 E.C.R. 1651, 18.
126. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1983); Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). It
has been argued that privacy is neither the best nor the only right included in the4 8 2
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ECt.HR nondiscrimination article (art. 14) was later unequivocally interpreted by the ECt.HR to include sexual orientation among the prohibited grounds of discrimination. 2 7
Despite the fact that the Convention does not apply within the
Community legal system directly, 28 the ECJ is competent to make
use of the legal principles derived from the Convention's provisions as
interpreted by the ECt.HR. It was up to the ECJ to recognise the
pro-gay rights development in the law of the Convention and to try to
transplant them into Community law. Notwithstanding the expectations of a number of scholars, 129 the Court appeared unprepared to
move in this direction. Its hard-line formalistic stand in Grant rendered the Community totally powerless in the domain of gay rights
protection.
B.

The ECI's Dubious Record in the Domain of Gay
Rights Protection

The ECJ played an especially controversial role in the development
of the principle of nondiscrimination on the ground of sexual orientation in the EU, developing
a body of "decisions [that] are irreconcila130
ble and incoherent.
Taking an active pro-egalitarian stand in the P. v. S. case,' where
the Court recognised, as discriminatory on the basis of sex, the dismissal of a transsexual employee intending to undergo gender reassignConvention which may be employed for gay rights protection-Articles 10 and 11 can
potentially be used. Clarice B. Rabinowitz, Note, Proposalsfor Progress: Sodomy
Laws and the European Convention on Human Rights, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 425, 427,
455-69 (1995).
127. Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, 1999-IV Eur. Ct.
H.R. $ 34 -36; Frettd v. France, App. No. 36515/97, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. $$ 32-33.
The scope of application of the article was somewhat limited before the entry into
force of Protocol 12 to the ECHR (1 April 2005), since it could only be applied in
conjunction with some other article of the Convention. See Protocol No. 12, Europ.T.
S. No. 177.
128. See D.J. HARRIS ET AL, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 27-28 (1995).
129. See generally Paul L. Spackman, Comment, Grant v. South-West Trains:
Equality for Same-Sex Partners in the European Community, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1063 (1997) (discussing gay rights protection before Grant was decided).
130. Bruce Carolan, Judicial Impediments to Legislating Equality for Same-Sex
Couples in the European Union, 40 TULSA L. REV. 527, 530 (2005); see Bamforth,
supra note 9; Iris Canor, Equality for Lesbians and Gay Men in the European Community Legal Order - "They Shall Be Male and Female"?, 7 MAASTRICHT J.OF EUR.
& COMP. L. 273 (2000); Adrian Williams, An Evaluation of the Historical Development of the JudicialApproach to Affording Employees ProtectionAgainst Discrimination on the Basis of Their Sexual Orientation, Bus. L. REV., Feb. 2004, at 32.
131. See Case C-13/94, P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143; see Leo Flynn, Case Law, Case
C-13/94, P v. S. and Cornwall County Council, Judgment of the Full Court of 30 April
1996, [1996] ECR 1-2143, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 367 (1997); Paul Skidmore, Commentary, Sex, Gender and Comparatorsin Employment Discrimination,26 INDus. L.J.
51 (1997).
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ment, 132 the Court disappointed gay rights activists by changing its
position in the later case-law.
In the Grant case, 3 3 which was "logically indistinguishable"' 3 4 from
P. v. S. and concerned granting travel concessions to a same-sex partner of a South-West Trains Ltd. employee, the ECJ did not follow the
P. v. S. rule, de facto reducing it only to cases involving transsexuals. 135 The grant of travel concessions in Grant was predicated on the
fact that sex of the spouse or partner should have been opposite to
that of the employee. 1 36 The Court found that Community law
prohibiting sex discrimination could not be used here and that Community law did not include prohibitions of discrimination based on
sexual orientation. 37 In this case, the Court did not take into consideration the opinion of AG Elmer who argued, referring to P. v. S. that
against em"the [EC] Treaty [is] precluding forms of discrimination
138
ployees based exclusively, or essentially, on gender.
The Court, refusing to compare homosexual couples with heterosexual ones, tends to interpret same-sex relationships as being by their
very nature different from opposite-sex ones, which allows the Court
not to apply the equality principle. Confirming a "stereotyped notion
of the European family"' 139 in D & Sweden v. Council,4 ' the Court
found that "the situation of an official who has registered a partnership [with a person of the same sex] in Sweden cannot be held to be
132. P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143, 21. The Court found the dismissal discriminatory under the Equal Treatment Directive, Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39)
40 (EEC).
133. Case C-249/96, GRANT V. SOUTH-WEST TRAINS LTD., 1998 E.C.R. 1-621; see
Katell Berthou & Annick Masselot, La CJCE et les couples homosexueles, 12 DROIT
SOCIAL 1034 (1998); Laurence R. Helfer, International Decisions, Grant v. SouthWest Trains, Ltd. Case C-249/96, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 200 (1999); John McInnes, Case
Law, Case C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South West Trains Ltd., Judgment of the
Full Court of 17 February 1998, [1998] ECR 1-636, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1043
(1999); Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The Latest Pronouncementfrom the European Court
of Justice on DiscriminationAgainst Homosexuals: Grant v. South-West Trains, Ltd.,
12 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 79 (1999).
134. Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy in Europe, or, Lisa Grant
Meets Adolf Hitler, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY
OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 623, 632.
135. GRANT, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621, 1$ 2, 37-42.
136. ID.
25-28.
137. ID.
43-47.
138. Opinion of the Advocate-General, supra note 7, at 16.
139. Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella & Emily Reid, The Changing Shape of the "European Family" and FundamentalRights, 27 EUR. L. REV. 80, 84 (2002).
140. Joined Cases C-122 & 125/99P, D & Sweden v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. 1-4319;
see Evelyn Ellis, Case Law, Joined Cases C-122 & 125/99P, D and Sweden v. Council,
Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 31 May 2001, Full Court, 39 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 151 (2002); Katell Berthou & Annick Masselot, Le mariage, les
patenariatset la CJCE: Minage d trois, 1 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROP8EN 679 (2002).
On the analysis of the outcome of the case in the first instance (T-264/97), see Christine Denys, Homosexuality: A Non-Issue in Community Law?, 24 EUR. L. REV. 419
/
(1999).
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4
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ruling that only mar-

ried (i.e., heterosexual) couples were entitled to family allowance
under the Staff Regulations.
The decisions in D. & Kingdom of Sweden and Grant were called
"wake up calls for the urgent need to protect rights of lesbian, gay
men, and bisexuals within the European Union," 142 putting "the
'1 43
Member States ... under ... a moral obligation to take action.'
There is no new case-law on nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation. Some applications for preliminary ruling have been withdrawn
following Grant.14 4 However, in its case-law on transsexuals, most recently K.B. v. National Health Service Pensions Agency 1 4 5 and Richards v. Secretary of State for Work & Pensions,1 4 6 the Court continues
to apply the P. v. S. sex discrimination test.
The case-law of the ECJ in the gay rights field is remarkable in at
least three respects, all closely related to each other.
First, the Court makes a clear distinction between transsexuals and
gays, applying the sex discrimination test to the former and refusing to
do so for the latter. Consequently, its case-law on the rights of
transsexuals is much more in line with human rights principles than
that on the rights of homosexuals. 147 At the same time, a strong argument can be made in favour of regarding
discrimination based on sex48
ual orientation as sex discrimination.
141. D & Sweden, 2001 E.C.R. 1-4319, $ 51.
142. Langenkamp, supra note 2, at 442.
143. McInnes, supra note 128, at 1058.
144. For example, following Grant, the application for preliminary ruling in Perkins
v. United Kingdom was withdrawn on July 13, 1998. Later, ex parte Perkins reached
ECt.HR. See Perkins v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 43208 & 44875/98, Eur. Ct. H.R.
$$ 22, 31 (2002).
145. See Case C-117/01, K.B. v. Nat'l Health Serv. Pensions Agency, 2004 E.C.R. I541; see also Iris Canor, Note, Case C-117/01, K.B. v. National Health Service Pensions Agency, Secretary of State for Health, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1113 (2004).
146. See Case C-423/04, Richards v. Sec'y of State for Work and Pensions, 2006
E.C.R. 1-3585.
147. According to some reports, this distinction owes its existence to the comparison in costs of guaranteeing equality to these two groups-transsexuals and homosexuals. See Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella & Annick Masselot, Under Construction: EU
Family Law, 29 EUR. L. REV. 32, 42 (2004). There are also other policy considerations related to sizes of these groups and potential political consequences of extending
the application of nondiscrimination to them. Mark Bell, Shifting Conceptions of Sexual Discriminationat the Courtof Justice: From P. v. S. to Grant v. SWT, 5 EUR. L.J.
63, 74-77 (1999).
148. See, e.g., Bamforth, supra note 9, at 701-14; Andrew Koppelman, Why DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination,69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
197 (1994); Robert Wintemute, Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination:
Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD. L. REV. 334, 344-353
(1997); see also Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the
Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 265 (1999) (explaining why
defining sex is not easy).
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Second, the Court's test in gay rights discrimination cases bizarrely
involves comparing the situation of homosexual men to that of lesbian
women, not heterosexuals. Thus, a male homosexual couple is compared to a lesbian couple, and no discrimination is found. Such a
choice of comparator involves a double change and thus does not
withstand the simplest logical test-comparing two men to two women involves both a change in the sex of the person and of his or her
partner.14 9 "[R]eveal[ing] a true perversion of the common-sense notion of equality," 50 such an approach invites strong analogies with the
underlying reasoning of miscegenation laws,'5 1 dismissed by the U.S.
53
Supreme Court in McLaughlin v. Florida'5 2 and Loving v. Virginia,'
and possibly even justifies the Nuremberg anti-Jewish laws of the
Third Reich. 1 54 It seems to come down to reasoning akin to "[t]he
law, in its majesty, prohibits the rich as well as the poor from sleeping
1' 55
under [the] bridges.'
Third, the ECJ refused to apply the ECHR standards of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, viewing itself legally
incapable of enlarging the scope of powers of the Community. a5 6 This
argument, which could be expected after Opinion 2/94, is a boringly
superficial one, given that in the early days of integration, human
rights protection was not included in the founding Treaties at all, and
the Court moved to protect human rights more or less on its own initiative, relying on the "constitutional traditions common to the Member
1 57
States" and the ECHR.
149. McInnes, supra note 133, at 1050.
150. Bruce Carolan, Rights of Sexual Minorities in Ireland and Europe: Rhetoric
Versus Reality, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 387, 405 (2001).
151. In Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), overruled in part by McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), the appeal to equal protection to strike down a statute
prohibiting interracial sex was dismissed using reasoning identical to that used by the
ECJ in Grant. Cf Koppelman, supra note 134, at 626 (arguing that the "miscegenation" law in Pace v. Alabama is analogous to the reasoning used by the ECJ in Grant).
152. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). The Supreme Court invalidated a
criminal statute prohibiting an unmarried interracial couple from habitually living in
and occupying the same room at night on the grounds that it "treats the interracial
couple ... differently than it does any other couple." Id. at 188.
153. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
154. See Koppelman, supra note 134, at 628.
155. Carolan, supra note 150, at 405.
156. See Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-621, 1 45.
157. See, e.g., Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm-Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419, %7;
Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fir
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125,
4; Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen-und
Baustoffgrol3handlung v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 13. For an analysis of this process, see HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 38-46 (6th ed. 2001); Joseph R. Wetzel, Note, Improving FundamentalRights Protectionin the European Union: Resolving the Conflict and
Confusion Between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.,
2823, 2834-37 (2003).
486

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol13/iss2/8
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V13.I2.7

28

Kochenov: Democracy and Human Rights-Not for Gay People?: EU Eastern Enlarg

2007] DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE E. U.

487

The Gay-Rights Acquis after the Adoption of the
Equality Directive
The legislator's response to the ECJ case-law came in the form of
the Council Directive 2000/78/EC,' 51 8 adopted on the basis of article 13
EC. The Directive outlawed discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and recognised that "[d]iscrimination based on . . . sexual
orientation may undermine the achievement of the objectives of the
EC Treaty." 15' 9 Sexual orientation is also one of the grounds on which
discrimination is prohibited by article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 160 and also is part of the unfortunate Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (art. 11-81(1)). It
can only be hoped that these legal developments allow the Court to
change its position and start providing better protection of gays
against discrimination.
At the same time, other recent legislative documents at the Union
level demonstrate the reluctance of the EU to move towards better
protection of gay rights. Directive 2004/38/EC on Citizens' Free
Movement,' 6 ' for instance, does not view same-sex couples and
spouses as equal to heterosexual couples, only recognising same-sex
couples in the countries where same-sex unions are recognised. 6 2
Clearly, creating two types of families/unions for the purposes of EC
law that depend on the Member State of residence chosen by the
couple is not at all in line with the idea of uniform and effective appliC.

158. Council Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC); see Dagmar Schiek, A
New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law?, 8 EUR. L.J. 290 (2002);
B. Koopman, De bijzondere inkadering van de Algemene Kaderrichtlijn, 5 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR EUROPEES RECHT 126 (2001). In the context of other
equality instruments, see Lisa Waddington & Mark Bell, More Equal Than Others:
DistinguishingEuropean Union Equality Directives, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 587
(2001).
159. Council Directive 2000/78, pmbl. T 11, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC).
160. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
The Charter is a "proclaimed document" having no binding force in EC law; nevertheless, the Court of the First Instance has made several references to the Charter.
See, e.g., Case T-177/01, Jdgo-Qu6r6 v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2365, 42, overruled
by Case C-263/02 P, 2004 E.C.R. 1-3425. In Advocate General Mischo's ill-famous
opinion, D & Sweden, he used the Charter to justify reluctance to advance in the
human rights field. See Joined Cases C-122 & 125/99P, D & Sweden v. Council, 2001
51 (Mischo, A.G., opinion). It has been argued that the rationale
E.C.R. 1-4319,
behind the drafting of the Charter was actually to limit the human rights reach of the
ECJ. See Allard Knook, The Court,the Charter,and the Vertical Division of Powers in
the European Union, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 367 (2005).
161. Council DIREcTIVE 2004/38, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 (EC).
162. Council DIRECTIVE 2004/38, ART. 2, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 88 (EC). Not providing for universal recognition of same-sex partnerships all over the EU, effet utile of
the Directive in this field is minimal, since the countries that established such partnerships already could recognize foreign partnerships of similar nature using international private law. For an argument for such recognition of French PACS in the
Netherlands, see Hans U. Jessurun d'Oliveira, Het Pacte Civil de Solidaritg, het geregistreerdepartnerschap, het opengestelde huwelijk, en het Nederlandse internationaal
privaatrecht,884 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD (2000).
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cation of EC law throughout the entire territory of the EU. 6 3 Using

ECJ case-law, it is easy to demonstrate, for instance, that the citizens
of the Member States where same-sex couples enjoy recognition will
be deterred from moving to the Member States where there is no such
recognition, to the detriment of the free-movement principles.1 6 4 This
failure of the Directive will have to be addressed by the Community
legislator in the nearest future. 16 5 Moreover, treating same-sex
to discriminacouples differently from heterosexual couples 1amounts
66
tion as prohibited by article 14 of the ECHR.
The position on the issue of recognizing same-sex couples taken by
the Citizens' Free Movement Directive is generally in line with other
EU legal provisions. Notwithstanding the fact that the ECJ regards
respect for family life as a fundamental right,16 7 the state of development of the EU family law is truly embryonic. 1 68 Any protection for
same-sex unions throughout the EU is totally lacking' 69 de facto mak-

ing it more difficult for the members of such unions to enjoy their EU

law rights. 7 ' Moreover, as underlined by Reid and Caracciolo di
Torella, such a position amounts to a total disregard of a legitimate
policy adopted by some Member States willing to create a legal insti7
tution for same-sex couples that would be comparable to marriage.1 1

The EU thus ignores the fact that "[m]arriage is not necessarily

viewed as the foundation of a family any more.' 1 72 Instead, a certain

163. For a critique of the Directive, see Mark Bell, Holding Back the Tide? CrossBorder Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships within the European Union, 12 EUR.
REV. OF PRIVATE L. 613 (2004).
164. E.g., Case C-370/90, R. V. IMMIGRATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL ex parte Sec'y of
State for Home Dep't, 1992 E.C.R. 1-4265, $$ 19-20.
165. Similar problems of same-sex unions' recognition are also acute in the United
States. See Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions After Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1265 (2004). Koppelman argues that nonrecognition of such unions by other States is unconstitutional. Id.
166. Karner v. Austria, App. No. 40016/98, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 37.
167. See Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, $ 28.
168. Caracciolo di Torella & Masselot, supra note 139, at 32.
169. In D & Sweden, the ECJ clearly linked the notion of a family with different
sexes of the spouses; also, the CFI has been unwilling to reinterpret the meaning of
"family." See Joined Cases C-122 & 125/99P, D & Sweden v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. I4319, 51; Case T-65/92, Arauxo-Dumay v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. 11-597, $ 30; see
also Bell, supra note 163, at 620-622 (explaining how same sex marriages would not
be valid across the European Union under current free movement legislation). It has
been argued that the ECJ can reverse the policy in this field. See O'Neill, supra note
14. To do this, the Court will need to change its orthodox position.
170. See Lina Papadopoulou, In(di)visible Citizens(hip): Same-sex Partnersin European Union Immigration Law, 21 Y.B. EUR. L. 229 (2002); Benoit Guiguet, Le droit
communautaire et la reconnaissance des partenaires de mgme sexe, 35 CAHIERS DE
DROIT EUROP8EN 537 (1999).
171. Caracciolo di Torella & Reid, supra note 139, at 84.
41
172. Caracciolo di Torella & Masselot, supra note 147, at 33.
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European conjugal hierarchy 173 is put in place, with registered heterosexual marriage at the top of the pyramid. Due to the limited application of the Staff Regulations compared to all the same-sex couples
within the scope of Community law who do not happen to be Community civil servants, the change in the Staff Regulations to avoid future
D. & Sweden situations cannot be regarded as a turning point in this
regard.
D.

Gay Rights Acquis and Gay Rights in the Pre-Accession

The dynamic account of the gay rights acquis can be used to explain
a sudden rise in attention to gay rights in the Copenhagen-related documents in the year 2001. After the adoption of the Equality Directive,
the Commission apparently saw itself better positioned to intervene in
the developments in gay rights taking place in the candidate countries.
Although the correlation between the development of the gay rights
acquis and the scope of the Commission's pre-accession demands in
this field is pretty obvious (virtually total silence on this issue preceding the 2001 Reports, succeeded by mentioning gay rights in a number
of Copenhagen-related documents that followed), it raises two important questions. First, where the Commission took its pre-accession
"European standard" from, and, second, whether the Commission felt
constrained by the EU's lack of internal
competence in this domain
174
before the Directive was adopted.
Regarding the second question, it is possible to speculate that the
Commission was very much aware of the competence split, allowing it
to address demands related to gay rights protection to the candidate
countries even before the Community became competent in this domain. This awareness explains sporadic inclusion by the Commission
of rare gay rights demands included in the Regular Reports preceding
the adoption of the Equality Directive. Accordingly, the Equality Directive did not provide the Commission with additional pre-accession
competence but simply attracted (alongside the pro-gay stand taken
by the EP) the Commission's attention to the issue of gay rights.
Answering the first question is more difficult. What kind of "European standard" could the Commission promote if the EU was simply
incompetent in this domain, unable to legislate in this field, and if the
ECJ refused to acknowledge the ECt.HR's gay rights jurisprudence as
part of the principles of EC law?
173. Daniel Borillo, Pluralisme conjugal ou higrarchiedes sexualites: La reconnaissance juridique des couples homosexuels dans l'Union europdenne, 46 MCGILL L.J.
875, 910 (2001).
174. Article 13 EC did not provide competences to combat discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, serving uniquely as a legal basis for the Community to
legislate in this domain. See European Union: Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on
European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 29,
2006, art. 13, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 1.
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Generally, two possible standards were available-the EP Resolution "on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC"17' 5 and
the 1981 PACE Recommendation 924 "On Discrimination against
Homosexuals,"1'76 accompanied by a Written Declaration addressing

the protection of homosexuals' rights situation in the CEECs.' 77

The substance of these two standards differs substantially-Recommendation 924 is narrower in scope compared to the EP Resolution.
The Recommendation focuses on the decriminalisation of homosexual

acts, nondiscrimination in the ages of consent for homosexual and heterosexual acts, and "equality of treatment of homosexuals with re'
gards, in particular, to employment, pay[,] and job security."178
It is
notable that the EU only reached the level of protection of gay rights
advocated by the Recommendation with the adoption of the Equality
Directive, i.e., exactly twenty years after the adoption of the Recommendation. The higher standard of the EP Resolution is yet to be
reached.' 7 9 Along with the elements of Recommendation 924, the
Resolution also called on the Member States and the Commission to
"end barring of lesbians and homosexual couples from marriage or
from an equivalent legal framework" 18 0 and to end "restrictions on
the rights of lesbians and homosexuals to be parents or to adopt or
foster children." 181
While both of these standards are not binding, the CoE standard is
somewhat more authoritative, since a number of its elements have
been incorporated into the case-law of the ECt.HR. This mostly concerns the decriminalisation of homosexual acts 1 82 and the application
175. Resolution on Equal Rights for Homosexuals and Lesbians in the EC, A30028/94, 1994 O.J. (C 61) 40.
176. EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB., Recommendation 924 (1981) on Discrimination
Against Homosexuals, 10th Sess., Doc. No. 924 (1981).
177. EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB., Written DeclarationNo. 227 on Homosexual Rights in
the New Democracies, Doc. No. 6679 (1993).

178.

EUR. PARL.

Ass.

DEB.,

Doc. No. 924, 1 7.

179. As outlined by Carolan, there is a huge gap between the actual level of protection of gay rights in the EU and the public image of nondiscrimination presented by
the Union. See Carolan, supra note 150, at 405.
180. Resolution on Equal Rights for Homosexuals and Lesbians in the EC, 1994
O.J. (C 61) 40,
14. Such a view of marriage is considerably broader than that
adopted by the ECt.HR in the course of interpretation of article 8 of the Convention.
X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9369/81, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1983); S v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 11716/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1986); Kerkhoven v. Netherlands, Appl. No. 15666/
89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1992).
181. 1994 O.J. (C 61) 40, 14. Nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
in the issues of parental child custody is protected. See Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v.
Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 35-36. This does not apply to
nondiscrimination on the same basis in adoptions. See Frettd v. France, App. No.
36515/97, 2002-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 43.
182. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1983); Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993);
A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35765/97, 2000-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.
490
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83
of the same age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual acts.
While this standard is not binding on the Community due to the ECJ's
position in Grant, it is nevertheless binding on the EU Member States,
all of them being members of the CoE.
In other words, the Commission could choose between a "minimum" standard, provided by the CoE and reflected in PACE Recommendation 924, and a "maximum" standard, proposed by the
European Parliament (and incorporating the first one).
Instead of choosing between the two, the Commission opted for
promoting uniquely those elements of the standards that found firm
reflection in the case-law of the ECt.HR, since no mention was made
in the pre-2001 Reports of the nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation in employment and other spheres. None of the Reports
adopted the standard formulated by the European Parliament in its
1994 Resolution. The Commission did not even mention the possibility of recognising the rights of homosexuals to adopt children or to
register partnerships (to say nothing about getting married), showing
no concern with any broader understanding of gay rights. In other
words, in practice, the ECt.HR served as a gay rights standard provider in the course of the pre-accession exercise. The Commission
adopted the most minimal standard possible, which does not come as
a surprise especially considering the threshold used to determine if an
applicant country meets the Copenhagen Criteria.

VI.

GAY RIGHTS IN THE BROADER CONTEXT

The last decade saw a veritable explosion of recognition of gay
rights around the world. Numerous jurisdictions, from U.N. bodies to
local and provincial authorities, demonstrated willingness to do their
best to award gay rights suitable protection. Viewed in this light, the
growing recognition of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the European Union and its Member States, as well as the
rise in the number of European jurisdictions allowing the registration
of same-sex partnerships and marriages, comes as a natural development. All the more natural was it for the EU to try to export the
momentum of change in the gay rights sphere to the new Member
States (then candidate countries) of Central and Eastern Europe.
At the same time, the developments at the Union level, and especially the case-law of the ECJ, were lagging far behind the front lines
of gay rights recognition. Moreover, when passing the decisions in
Grant and D & Sweden the ECJ was very well aware of the international developments in gay rights protection. In Grant, for instance,
the Court dismissed the reasoning of the U.N. Human Rights Com183. See Sutherland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25186/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
491
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mittee.' 18 4 In Toonen v. Australia, the Committee ruled that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was included among the
grounds of discrimination prohibited by article 26 of the ICCPR.'8 5
The ECJ was reluctant to follow this example. It reaffirmed that it
usually takes account of ICCPR in the matters of human rights 18 6 but
pointed out that following the Committee's interpretation would entail an extension of the human rights jurisdiction of the Community,
which it was not entitled to do, since "rights cannot in themselves have
the effect of extending the scope of the Treaty provisions beyond the
competences of the Community."1'87 The ECJ also submitted that the
decisions of the Committee were not binding and distanced itself from
the interpretation of discrimination in Toonen.a8 8 In view of the fact
that the Community is bound by international law,1 89 and given the
Court's role in reading fundamental rights principles into the Treaties,1 9 ° it is difficult to fully agree with such an assessment. 1 9'
Later case-law of the U.N. Human Rights Committee demonstrates
with all clarity that Toonen was not some deviation from commonly
accepted international practice as the ECJ tried to present it in
Grant,a92 but is still good law, and has been built upon. Following
Toonen, the Committee ruled in Young v. Australia 93 that there was
no legitimate reason to deny same-sex partners government benefits
offered to heterosexual couples. Accordingly, Young, as a partner of
an Australian veteran, was entitled to a government pension. 194 The
parallels between this case and D. & Kingdom of Sweden, decided one
year later are obvious.
In Europe, the ECt.HR played a particularly constructive role in
the protection of gay rights. This Court ruled, inter alia, that criminalisation of homosexual acts between consenting adults was illegal,' 95
184. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee Under the Optional Protocol, 133, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31,
1994), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/sdecisionsvol5.pdf.
185. Id. at 139 8.7.
186. See Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-621, 9T
43-44.
187. Id. 45.
188. Id.
46, 47.
189. Case C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen, 1992 E.C.R. 6019, 9.
190. See sources cited supra note 157.
191. See Canor, supra note 130, at 287-90.
192. See Grant, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621,
47.
193. Young v. Australia, Communication No. 941/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/
941/2000 (Human Rights Comm. Aug. 12, 2003).
194. Id. at 12.
195. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1983); Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1988). This does not apply to consensual sadomasochistic practices between adult
men. Laskey v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 21627, 21826, & 21974/93, 1997-1 Eur.
Ct. H.R. $T 45-51.
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prohibited age-of-consent discrimination in criminal law targeting
same-sex couples,' 96 and employed the nondiscrimination principle to
overturn a national decision refusing a father the custody of his child
on the sole ground of his homosexuality.' 97 The ECt.HR disallowed,
in Karner, discrimination between unmarried heterosexual and samesex couples.1 98 In Karner, the ECt.HR underlined that the Austrian
of a "traditional family unit" was
argument related to the protection
"abstract" and dismissed it. 199 The dismissal of gays from the armed
forces on the grounds of their sexual orientation was also announced
to be in violation of the Convention (there was, inter alia a violation of
art. 8 (private life)). 200 Equally informative is ECt.HR case-law on
transsexuals, which also demonstrates that the Court takes an approach that can be called somewhat more progressive than that
adopted by other jurisdictions. Therefore, under the right to private
life, a male to female transsexual was entitled a pension starting at the
20 1
age of 60, which is the pension age for female workers in the U.K.
Nevertheless, even the ECt.HR made some steps in the direction of
a more cautious approach to gay rights protection. In a recent judgement, it refused a gay man the right 20 2 to adopt a child, ruling in Frett
that the nondiscrimination principle of article 14 of the Convention,
although covering nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, did not apply to that particular situation. The Court reasoned
that the prohibition pursued a legitimate aim of "protect[ing] the
health and rights of children., 20 3 No scientific evidence was presented
by the French government to substantiate such a position. The decision in the Frettg case came totally unexpectedly after Salgueiro da
Silva Mouta, which was logically identical to it and yet produced a
different outcome.
What were the reasons behind such a change of position? It could
be suggested that the ECt.HR decision in Frettg is an indirect conse196. See Sutherland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25186/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
197. See Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, 1999-IV Eur. Ct.
H.R.
198. Karner v. Austria, App. No. 40016/98, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 42.
199. Id. 41.
200. Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31417 & 32377/96, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1999); Smith v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985 & 33986/96, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
201. Grant v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32570/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. $ 2, 7, 51 (2006).
This case is similar to the ECI's Case C-423/04, Richards v. Sec'y of State for Work
and Pensions, 2006 E.C.R. 1-3585.
202. Such a right exists in French family law under art. 343-1 of the Civil Code. C.
Civ. art. 343-1 (Fr.).
203. Frettd v. France, App. No. 36515/97, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 38. For (harsh)
critique, see Daniel Borrillo & Thierry Pitois-Etienne, Difftrence des sexes et adoption: la <<psychanalyseadministrative>>contre les droits subjectifs de L'individu, 49 McGILL L.J., 1035, 1048-51 (2004); Thomas Willoughby Stone, Comment, Margin of
Appreciation Gone Awry: The European Court of Human Rights' Implicit Use of the
PrecautionaryPrinciple in Frettd v. France to Backtrack on Protectionfrom Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 271 (2003).
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quence of the enlargement of the CoE and, in a way, reflects the situation of gay rights in Eastern Europe. It is telling to examine the
majority in the case. Besides the French judge, those voting to de
facto overrule Salgueiro da Silva Mouta included judges from Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Albania. The judges who voted against
were from Austria, Belgium, and the U.K.2 °4
In the light of the majority in Fretd, the future of gay rights in the
European Union can also be deemed to be rather grim. The Commission's unwillingness to treat this issue seriously in the course of the
pre-accession process resulted in a situation where countries reluctant
to protect gay rights managed to join the European Union. Consequently, the situation with regards to the recognition of same-sex partnerships and gay rights protection in the EU changed instantly on
May 1, 2004, the day of enlargement. Among the new Member States,
only Hungary permitted gays to enter civil unions. The gay rights record of other new Member States is rather alarming. The danger of
Frett majorities in the ECJ and CFI2 °5 is more than real.
Generally speaking, however, there is a growing concern with gay
rights protection at the global level. In this, the European Union
moves apace with world development following other jurisdictions in
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In the
course of the 1990s, such legislation was passed in a great number of
the EU-15 Member States.20 6 Also, the Constitutional Courts of Canada 2 17 and South Africa 2 1 moved in the direction of broadening the
scope of gay rights in their respective jurisdictions.20 9 The situation
with gay rights in the world is improving rapidly.
VII.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Union's noncompliance with any of the standards of gay rights
protection it had at its disposal in 1997, when the pre-accession Regular Reporting of the East European applicants for membership commenced, did not prevent it from promoting gay rights protection as a
necessary pre-accession requirement included in the Copenhagen Criteria. The range of the Copenhagen-related legal instruments, coupled with the pre-accession principle of conditionality that offered the
204. The unanimous opinion in Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portlandwas delivered
with two East European judges (Croatian and Polish) on the panel. See Salgueiro da
Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.
205. Since ECJ and CFI issue unanimous judgements it will be very difficult to find
out for sure which judges were responsible for a given decision.
206. Waaldijk, supra note 41, at 649-50.
207. See Vriend v. The Queen, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Can.); Egan v. The Queen,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.).
208. Nat'l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6
(CC) (S. Afr.).
209. Kenneth McK. Norrie, Constitutional Challenges to Sexual Orientation Dis494
crimination, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 755, 755-58 (2000).
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EU a virtual carte blanche in "steering" the democratic and human
rights reforms in the candidate countries, all led observers to believe
that the EU would advance gay rights protection in the candidate
countries during the pre-accession exercise. This has not happened.
In focusing timorously and inconsistently on a minimal range of rights,
the Commission's performance in the course of the pre-accession exercise left much to be desired. Such performance was partly due to
the confusion within the gay rights acquis and the orthodox case-law
of the ECJ in this field. The development of the ECt.HR jurisprudence in the field of gay rights and the adoption of the Equality Directive has the potential to change this situation. As far as the
application of the EU enlargement law is concerned, the present practice of virtually ignoring gay rights is unsustainable. The European
Commission should reconsider the pre-accession role played by gay
rights in the enlargements to come.
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